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he goal of monetary policy as conducted by the Bank of Japan is to
contribute to the sound development of the national economy
through the pursuit of price stability. The objective of price stability,
however, is not precisely defined as it has been for other central banks.
Following the implementation of the new Bank of Japan Law in 1998, the
monetary policy framework is characterized by central bank independ-
ence, the primacy of the price stability objective, instrument independ-
ence, and policy decisions made by a monetary policy committee with
regular meetings and published minutes. At its meetings, the monetary
policy committee discusses the economic and financial situation and then
decides matters relating to monetary policy, including the following: the
guideline for money market operations; the official discount rate; reserve
requirements ratios; the Bank’s view of economic and financial develop-
ments; and the types, terms, and conditions of bills and bonds used in
money market operations.
Bank of Japan’s Main Monetary Policy Instruments
In recent years, the Bank of Japan has targeted a specific level of the
uncollateralized overnight call rate, with open market operations aimed
at increasing the provision of funds when the overnight call rate is above
target, and at decreasing the provision of funds when the overnight call
rate is below target. The funds whose provision the Bank modifies in its
day-to-day open market operations are the current account balances that
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made for the most part by the legal reserve require-
ments of depository institutions, and for the rest by the
working balances of both depository and nondeposi-
tory institutions.1
The practice of influencing the price of liquidity
supplied through open market operations reflects the
central role that discretionary operations now play in
the management of liquidity. Market operations are
geared to balancing the market for current account bal-
ances as a whole, and financial institutions are not
expected to rely on standing facilities. Since mid-1995,
the Bank of Japan has steered the overnight rate below
the discount rate, thus rendering the discount window
ineffective as a tool for active liquidity management. 
While under ordinary circumstances the Bank of
Japan targets the overnight call rate, in March 2001 the
Bank enacted new procedures for market operations
that will stay in place until the deflationary pressures
subside. Under the new procedures, the Bank sets a
target for the outstanding balance of current accounts.
The target for the outstanding balances held at the
Bank is currently set with the goal of driving the
overnight call rate to around zero.2 However, by set-
ting a reserve target, the Bank intends to allow, up to a
point, fluctuations in the overnight call rate. The con-
comitant introduction of a Lombard facility provides a
ceiling for the overnight call rate and limits its range of
fluctuation. 
Standing Facilities
Until mid-1995, the Bank of Japan employed the
discount window as a tool for active liquidity manage-
ment. The amount and maturity of credits granted
through the window were entirely discretionary, and
the Bank could also recall loans at will. However, the
window became ineffective when the Bank steered the
overnight call rate below the discount rate, and in
January 1996 the Bank announced it would no longer
use discount credit as part of its regular liquidity man-
agement operations. 
With the introduction of the new Lombard facility,
the Bank of Japan suspended the discounting of com-
mercial bills. The Lombard facility is fully collateral-
ized and is activated at the request of the counterpar-
ties. The interest rate charged is the posted official dis-
count rate (now called the “basic loan rate”). Apenalty,
however, is levied to counterparties that use the facili-
ty longer than five days per month on a cumulative
business-day basis.3 At present, only government
bonds and loans on deeds can be pledged as collateral,
but effective December 2001 the collateral for the
Lombard facility will be merged with pooled collateral
used for bill purchasing operations, daylight over-
drafts, and the security of Treasury fund operations.4
While in principle all counterparties that maintain bal-
ances at the Bank of Japan are eligible to use the
Lombard facility, depository financial institutions are
more likely to access it, since securities companies
must pay a higher tax on borrowing from the facility. 
The Bank of Japan also provides fully collateral-
ized intraday overdrafts to all Bank of Japan account
holders. Eligible collateral is pooled collateral that con-
forms to the “guidelines on eligible collateral” dis-
cussed below. No quantitative limit is imposed on the
amount of intraday liquidity, and no interest rate is
charged. As usual, if the liquidity provided intraday is
not repaid by the end of the business day, the Bank
will levy a considerable penalty interest rate. 
Open Market Operations5
Since the beginning of 2001, the Bank of Japan has
shifted from a designated-time net settlement system
to a real-time gross settlement system (RTGS), which
allows the Bank to process every transaction in real
time and on an order-by-order basis. The average size
of the Bank’s daily market operations is significantly
greater than the average size of the Federal Reserve’s
operations, because daily fluctuations in banknotes in
circulation and in the Treasury balance are much
wider in Japan than in other industrialized countries.6
The operational tools available to the Bank of
Japan are listed in Table 1. The type and tools of mar-
1 Balances held at the Bank of Japan are not remunerated.
Nondepository financial institutions are securities firms and tanshi
(money market brokers) companies.  
2 As of December 19, 2001, the Bank of Japan conducts money
market operations aiming for an outstanding balance of current
accounts held at the Bank of about 10 to 15 trillion yen. In the event
of financial market instability, the Bank will provide as much liquid-
ity as needed, irrespective of the target. 
3 The penalty rate is at least 200 basis points in excess of the
basic loan rate. 
4 The fact that currently Lombard loans are not processed elec-
tronically, like all other Bank of Japan market transactions, puts a
burden on the borrower in terms of additional operational and
insurance costs. These additional costs may explain why overnight
call rates rose well above the Lombard rate on the last day of the 
fiscal year 2001.
5 Miyanoya (2000) provides a comprehensive description of
the Bank of Japan’s market operations. 
6 Miyanoya (2000, p. 12) notes that in 1998, the average weekly
fluctuation in banknotes in Japan was approximately seven times
larger than in the United States, while the average weekly fluctua-
tion in the Treasury balance was approximately four times larger. Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 41
ket operations conducted by the Bank depend on the
underlying purpose of the operation. In order to meet
the secular increase in the demand for currency that
accompanies the long-run trend of growth in the econ-
omy, the Bank conducts outright purchases of
Japanese government bonds.7
The Bank of Japan uses, instead, a wider set of
tools for its day-to-day operations. Specifically, the
Bank increasingly relies on repurchase agreement
transactions involving government securities: Japanese
government bonds (JGBs), Treasury bills (TBs), and
financing bills (FBs) and commercial paper (CP). In
addition, the Bank relies on outright purchases (sales)
of TBs and FBs,8 and outright purchases of bills.9 The
considerable expansion of the repo market in the past
few years and the merits of repo transactions in terms
of risk management are usually cited as the main rea-
sons behind the Bank of Japan’s increasing reliance on
repos for its short-term provision (absorption) of funds. 
In the past, because of the large size of the bill
market, the Bank of Japan relied heavily on outright
purchases of bills for its market operations. With a
view toward facilitating their use in market opera-
tions, the Bank has recently revised the principal terms
and conditions pertaining to bill-purchasing opera-
tions. In particular, the Bank widened the number of
eligible counterparties, extended the maturity of the
operations from three to six months, and allowed as
collateral a wide range of pooled collateral.10Although
the Bank in its outright purchase of bills buys master
bills issued by operations counterparties only, these
bills can be backed by various private sector liabilities
such as commercial paper, com-
mercial bills, and straight bonds.
The maturity of market
operations involving the short-
term provision (absorption) of
funds is six months or less for
purchases/sales of TBs and FBs
under repurchase agreements,
for JGB repos, and for outright
purchases of bills, and three
months or less for outright sales
of Bank of Japan bills and pur-
chases of CP under repurchase
agreements. In the year 2000, the
average maturity of repurchase
agreements operations in gov-
ernment securities was approxi-
mately 50 days. A competitive
yield auction is used for all mar-
ket operations.11
Market operations have also been used by the
Bank in the recent past to stabilize financial markets.
This has in some instances involved “dual” operations
with the aim of stabilizing market interest rates across
the board. For example, from October to December
Table 1
Tools of Market Operations
Provision of short-term funds
Purchases of Treasury bills/financing bills (TBs/FBs) under repurchase
agreements
Outright purchases of TBs/FBs
Borrowing of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) against cash collateral
(JGB repos)
Outright purchases of bills
Purchases of commercial paper under repurchase agreements
Absorption of funds over a short term
Sales of TBs/FBs under repurchase agreements
Outright sales of TBs/FBs
Outright sales of bills issued by the Bank of Japan
Provision of long-term funds
Outright purchases of JGBs
7 The Bank of Japan would normally accept 10-year and 20-
year government bonds for outright purchases of Japanese
Government Bonds. In mid-2001, however, the Bank started accept-
ing 2-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year government bonds also. 
8 Financing bills are discounted bills issued by the government
to raise short-term funds. Until March 1999, FBs were offered at a
fixed discount rate below market interest rates. Therefore, private
financial institutions rarely submitted bids and the Bank of Japan had
been purchasing almost the entire amount issued. Since April 1999,
however, public auction has generally been used for the issuance of
FBs. Since then, the FBs market has been expanding rapidly. 
9 The Bank of Japan purchases bills issued by financial insti-
tutions whose drawers, drawees, and payees are the financial
institutions themselves. The purchase of bills by the Bank is
against collateral.
10 The need to inject large amounts of liquidity into the econo-
my under extraordinary circumstances likely explains the Bank of
Japan’s heavy reliance on outright purchase of bills in its market
operations in recent months. Of the 43.5 trillion yen in outstanding
operations at the end of April 2001, 24.7 trillion was for purchases of
TBs and FBs under repurchase agreements; 6 trillion for JGB repos;
1.6 trillion for purchases of CP under repurchase agreements; 8.7
trillion for outright purchases of bills; 6.2 trillion for outright pur-
chases of TBs and FBs; and 3.7 trillion for outright sales of bills
drawn by the Bank of Japan. At the end of July 2001, the Bank had
curtailed purchases of TBs and FBs under repurchase agreements (to
1.5 trillion) and increased JGB repos (to 15.2 trillion) and outright
purchases of bills (to 14.3 trillion).
11 For its market operations, the Bank selects bidders according
to criteria that are made public. Bidders must hold current accounts
at the Bank’s head office, they must be of adequate creditworthiness,
they must be part of the BOJ-NET network, and they must be active
players in the market concerned. For the institutions that have pre-
viously been counterparties of the Bank’s market operations, the
amount of successful bids in the past will also be considered.42 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
1998, the Bank of Japan set out to
contain the upward pressure on
interest rates on term instru-
ments maturing beyond the
year-end, which reflected height-
ened concern about the stability
of the financial system, while
preventing the overnight call
rate from falling below the target
level. For this purpose, on the
asset side the Bank increased
repo operations and CP opera-
tions, while on the liability side
the Bank increased items related
to bill-selling operations, which
were conducted to absorb liquid-




agreements operations and bor-
rowing of JGBs against cash col-
lateral, the Bank of Japan marks
to market daily and applies mar-
gin calls. An initial haircut also
applies. As concerns the pur-
chase of bills, daylight over-
drafts, and access to the
Lombard facility,12 Table 2 pro-
vides a description of the eligi-
ble collateral and of the initial
haircut applied to the different
assets. As already mentioned,
the collateral can be pooled.
Operation counterparties can
substitute collateral at any time,
as long as the amount pledged
(after the initial haircut) covers
the total exposure. The list of eli-
gible collateral tends to be liber-
al in that, beside government-
guaranteed bonds, it includes
bonds issued by public corpora-
tions, corporate bonds, and
asset-backed securities. In addi-
tion, foreign government bonds
are also accepted, provided they
are denominated in Japanese
yen. 
Table 2






A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 1 year 99
(2) more than 1 year and up to 5 years 98
(3) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 96
(4) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 94
(5) more than 20 years 90
2. Financing Bills 99
3. Government-Guaranteed Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 97
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 95
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 90
(4) more than 20 years 85
4. Municipal Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 97
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 95
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 90
(4) more than 20 years 85
5. Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) Agency Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
6. Corporate Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
7. Asset-backed Securities
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
8. Foreign Government Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
9. International Financial Institution Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
10. Bills (including commercial paper) 95
b
11. Loans on Deeds (collateral eligible until March 31, 2001) 80
c
12. Interest-bearing Bank Debentures 96
13. Discount Bank Debentures (collateral eligible until March 31, 2002) 96
14. Bonds Corresponding to Corporate Bonds
A residual maturity of: (1) Up to 5 years 96
(2) more than 5 years and up to 10 years 93
(3) more than 10 years and up to 20 years 85
(4) more than 20 years 80
a percent of market price
bpercent of face value
cpercent of outstanding principal balance
Source: Bank of Japan. 2000. Establishment of Guidelines on Eligible Collateral.Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review 43
Selected Fiscal Issues
Japan has become the largest issuer of net debt
among industrial countries, as net government bond
issues have increased fivefold since 1990. The general
government net debt, at 38 percent of GDP in 1999, is
still comparatively small by international standards.
Social security assets, however, are more than offset by
future pension obligations. Given the underfunded
nature of the pension system, a better measure of the
government’s obligations is given by the net debt
excluding social security assets, which, at 88 percent of
GDP in 1999, is significantly higher than in most other
industrialized countries. In reaction to the rapid deteri-
oration in its fiscal position and the rapid aging of soci-
ety during the twenty-first century, the Japanese gov-
ernment has started asserting openly the urgent need
to improve the current fiscal position and to imple-
ment a broad structural reform of public finances.
12 For the Lombard facility, the list of collateral in Table 2 will
become effective December 2001, when the form of lending will
change from loans on bills to an electronic loan. Currently, collateral
must be pledged in advance and only government bonds and loans
on deeds are acceptable. 
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